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Abstract 
This paper develops a model designed to capture the fiscal externalities associated 
with redistributive policy in a system of jurisdictions. Policy changes in one jurisdiction 
affect other jurisdictions through both migration and work-disincentive effects. Previ­
ous work ignores work-disincentive effects and concludes that centralization is sufficient 
to eliminate fiscal externalities. Inclusion of work-disincentive effects unambiguously 
worsens fiscal externalities under both centralized and decentralized redistribution. Suf­
ficiently severe work-disincentive effects guarantee that an increase in redistribution will 
harm the poor. 
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1 Introduction 
Wrthin the European Union, a debate has arisen over the migrational consequences of a borderless 
society. Economic theory predicts that, when individuals are costlessly mobile across a system of 
jurisdictions, individuals will "vote with their feet" and choose the jurisdiction whose policies 
maximize their utility [Tiebout 1956]. Recent literature suggests that this rent-seeking behavior 
penalizes high-benefit countries in a common labor market because those countries will attract 
welfare recipients and repel workers [Brown and Oates 1987]. To the extent that this is the case, 
it appears likely that a "common market" in Europe would yield greater benefits to nations with low 
levels of redistribution; worse, it is feared that these pressures would encourage the more 
"progres.5ive" members of the EU to lower their benefits [Sinn 1990]. To a European Union whose 
leaders support high levels of redistribution, such pressures are anathema.1
Traditional economic analysis suggests that redistribution should be performed by a central 
government rather than by decentralized jurisdictions. Economists such as Musgrave [1971] and 
Oates [ 1968] have noted that a central government could impose equal levels of redistribution across
all jurisdictions, thereby eliminating the fiscal incentives to migrate. In effect, centralized 
redistribution can transform a system of jurisdictions into a single jurisdiction from which mobile 
individuals cannot escape. From this, advocates of redistribution have concluded that a high level 
·1 would like to thank Peter Mieszkowski, Thomas R. Saving and participants at the 1994
annual meetings of the Public Choice Society for helpful comments and suggestions. Any 
remanung errors are my own. 
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of redistribution can be achieved without hannful spillovers through the intervention of a central 
government. 
This conclusion is critically dependent on the absence of any labor-supply effects of 
redistributive policy. Previous work is virtually silent on the subject of the labor-leisure decision. 2 
However, endogeneity of the labor-leisure decision can have significant effects on equilibrium 
outcomes. For example, a rise in welfare benefits by one jurisdictions might increase the absolute 
number of poor as well as induce migration across jurisdictions. Even a central government is 
vulnerable to these effects; although workers/recipients cannot escape a central government's 
redistnbutive policy through migration, it is possible for them to choose leisure over labor. For this 
reason, endogeneity of the labor-leisure decision permits an analysis of spillovers that traditional 
analyses fail to capture. 
The basic :framework of the paper is as follows. The first section of the paper describes the 
basic model. The second section examines migratory responses to differential levels of 
redistnbution in the context of common markets for labor and amenities when the decision to work 
is exogenous. In this section, we reach the standard conclusions of the "fiscal federalists" with an 
intriguing twist: the observed relationship between benefits and wages need not rely on altruism for 
its explanatiort The third section extends the basic analysis through endogeneity of the labor-leisure 
decisiOTL In this section, we severely weaken the standard conclusions of the "fiscal federalists" and 
conclude that an increase in redistribution by a single jurisdiction need not benefit the poor. The 
fourth section applies the analysis to centraliz.ation and economic efficiency. In this section, we 
show that centraliz.ation does not suffice to eliminate spillovers and that centralized redistribution 
does not produce economic efficiency when the central authority chooses a positive level of 
redistribution. The final section gives concluding thoughts. In this section, we apply the 
conclusions of the paper to the European Union and the United States. 
2 A Description of the Model
In this paper� we examine redistribution in the context of a system of jurisdictions whose citizens 
seek to maximize net income. In general, previous work assumes that income is exogenous to the 
model, and individuals migrate in response to differentials in the price of housing [e.g. Epple and 
Romer 1991]. However, a pioneering article by David Wildasin explicitly considers the case in 
which income is endogenous to the model [Wildasin 1991]. In the Wildasin framework, a number 
of jurisdictions share a common labor market within which income-maximizing individuals receive 
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both welfare benefits and wages. Although this model provides a number of empirical insights, it 
is most appropriate for an analysis of local public goods because most workers do not receive 
welfare payments and most recipients do not work [Orr 1976]. Thus, an explicit attempt to model 
welfare benefits requires a different formulation. 
When jurisdictions offer differential incomes to costlessly mobile individuals, the individuals 
will migrate until incomes are equalized.3 In order for jurisdictional incomes to equilibrate, income 
must be congestible in the sense that, for each type of individual, an increase in the number of 
residents lowers jurisdictional income.4 It is natural for labor markets to form the basis of this 
congestibility when all mobile individuals are employed. In a theoretical framework which 
incorporates both working and nonworking individuals, the exclusive use of labor markets to 
equilibrate individuals becomes problematic. If the poor do not respond to a common labor market, 
however, to what equilibrating mechanism do they respond? 
We assume that both poor and employed individuals respond to market forces in the form 
oflocational amenities. It is well known that amenities affect the migration decisions of individuals 
[Rosen 1979, Graves and Linneman 1979]. In fact, empirical work reveals that regional wage 
differentials are largely a function of amenities [Roback 1982]. A broad range of amenities are 
subject to congestion; examples include beaches, public parks, and even the crime rate, which 
increases with increasing population density.5 Thus, a broadly defined measure of locational 
amenities satisfies a necessary condition for market equilibrium. 
Although both poor and employed individuals respond to amenity differentials in the model, 
we assume that a poor individual will consume a greater quantity of amenities than an employed 
individual. This assumption need not rest upon any of the observed correlations between personal 
income and deleterious activities such as crime, although these effects would only accentuate the 
conclusions of this paper. We need only assume that individuals who work must sacrifice time that 
would otherwise have been used to consume amenities, or that poor individuals are likely to engage 
in a relatively intense consumption of amenities because they lack the money to purchase consumer 
goods. Without loss of generality, we normalize these congestion effects in relation to poor 
individuals. 
There are two types of individuals in the model, employed and poor, who are costlessly 
mobile across a fixed number of jurisdictions.6 Each jurisdiction is endowed with a Ricardian 
production function J;(e;) for the numeraire commodity, where i is the jurisdiction of interest and e1
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is the number of individuals who are employed in the jurisdiction.7 This production function is 
monotonically increasing and concave in the number of employed individuals. Each jurisdiction is 
aJso endowed with an amenities function a/P; + a.e) , where a. is a scale factor less than unity and
p,is the number of individuals who reside in the jurisdiction but are not employed.8 The amenities 
function is monotonically decreasing in its argument. 
Employed individuals are endowed with one unit of labor which must be used to produce the 
numeraire commodity. Each employed individual receives from his employer the marginal value 
oflabor in production of the numeraire, and no resident who is able to work may be excluded from 
employment. Poor individuals, on the other hand, receive subsidies from their local jurisdiction 
instead of wages from an employer. These subsidies are identical across all recipients in a given 
jurisdiction, and no resident who is poor may be excluded from the subsidy. Subsidies are provided 
by landlords, who are assumed to claim all residual profits; both the landlords and their capital are 
immobile. 
Let the benefit level paid to poor individuals from a given jurisdiction be denoted b,. Then
the net income of poor individuals in jurisdiction i is given by
(1) 
Suppose that the poor seek to maximize net income. Since the poor are costlessly mobile across 
jurisdictions, the equilibrium net income of the poor must be identical across all jurisdictions. In 
other words, 
bi+ a/p; + a.e;) = bi +a/pi+ a.e) V iJ. 
Denote this level of net income by Y". 
(2) 
Let the wage paid to employed individuals from a given jurisdiction be /; ( e ;) . Then the net
income of employed individuals is given by the expression 
(3) 
Suppose that the--em!'leyed seek-to�-:net-inoorne.··· Since-the employed are costlessly mobile 
across jurisdictions, the equilibrium net income of the employed must be identical across 
jurisdictions. In other words, 
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(4) 
Denote this level of net income by .fE. 
Finally, let M be the total number of mobile individuals in the system. Since these mobile 
individuals are divided into at most two types, it must be the case that 
(5) 
When the decision to work is exogenous to the model, it is possible to write equations for each type 
of individual: 
3 Comparative Statics and the Wage-Benefit Correlation
(5b) 
(5a) 
An examination of the traditional framework is instructive both for its confirmation of traditional 
conclusions and its application to an empirical regularity: the wage-benefit correlation. There is 
substantial evidence from the United States that the level of welfare benefits provided by a 
jurisdiction is correlated with the prevailing wage in that jurisdiction [Orr 1976]. Economists have 
generally explained this correlation through an appeal to altruism tempered by decreasing marginal 
utility of income [Gramlich and Laren 1984]. According to this explanation, a relatively high 
prevailing wage induces a relatively high welfare payment in a jurisdiction. In this section, we 
investigate the comparative statics of the system of jurisdictions and reach a dramatically different 
explanation for the wage-benefit correlation. 
An increase in redistribution by jurisdiction i increases the net income of the poor in
jurisdiction i. Since such a difference cannot persist in equilibrium� poor individuals must migrate
from other jurisdictions to jurisdiction i. It is convenient to solve for the migration of employed
individuals first. To determine the magnitude of this effect, we must first solve the system of 
equations characteriz.ed by (2) and ( 4). A joint implication of these equations is that the equilibrium 
income differential is equalized across jurisdictions. Therefore, 
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(6) 
Using this equation, it is possible to solve implicitly for e;(Y 8 - Y P + h ;) . The resulting functions
are simply r 1(Y E - Y p +by and their derivatives must be negative because wages are decreasing
in e,. Substituting each labor-demand equation into (5b ), it is possible to solve for the net income
differential as a function of benefit levels. 
It can be shown by implicit differentiation of(5b) that 
(1) 
This derivative, which we shall denote by the symbol P;, measures the marginal impact of a change
in redistribution on the distribution of income. The migration of employed individuals induced by 
a change in b, is given by
aei I 
- = (1 + f>..)e,. < 0ab. P1 I 
ae. I 
_J = f>.,e. > 0ab. Pj I I 
(Sa) 
(Sb) 
These equations demonstrate the spillover effect for employed individuals: the equilibrium number 
of employed individuals is unambiguously lower in jurisdiction i and higher in all other
jurisdictions. 
In a similar manner, once the equilibrium effects on employed individuals are known, it is 
possible to solve for the equilibrium allocation of poor individuals. The change in net income for 
poor individuals is 
(9) 
This derivative, which we shall denote by the symbol 1t; measures the marginal impact of a change
in redistribution on the net income of the poor. The migration of poor individuals induced by a 
change in b, is given by
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Op. -1 I 
-1 = -(1 - 1t)(a; )1 - a:(l + P;)e; > 0
ah; 
Op} ( -1)/ p I - = 1t Q· - a; .e. < 0.
ab. J I JI I 
(IOa) 
(!Ob) 
These equations demonstrate the spillover effect for poor individuals: the equilibrium number of 
poor individuals is unambiguously higher in jurisdiction i and lower in all other jurisdictions.
These results permit a discussion of the aggregate effects of a change in b,. A unilateral
increase in benefits by jurisdiction i induces poor individuals to move from all other jurisdictions
to jurisdiction i. Since every jurisdiction experiences a change in the number ofresident poor, every
jurisdiction experiences a change in the level of amenities available to employed individuals. In 
particular, the reduced level of amenities in jurisdiction i and the increased level of amenities in all 
other jurisdictions induce migration of employed individuals from jurisdiction i into all other
jurisdictions. This migration continues until a new equilibrium is established. In this new 
equilibrium, the net income of the poor is unambiguously higher, although equation (9) demonstrates 
that the net income of the poor in jurisdiction i cannot increase by the full amount of the benefit
mcrease. 
The presence of a wage-benefit correlation follows directly from the conclusions of this 
section By equation ( 6), the benefit level offered by a jurisdiction will be positively correlated with 
the wage in that jurisdiction. However, the wage-benefit correlation is due to market forces rather 
than altruism. Causation is reversed from the traditional explanation: high benefit levels increase 
the scarcity of labor by "driving out" employed individuals, and it is this decrease in the number of 
employed individuals that increases the prevailing wage. Thus, the wage-benefit correlation need 
not rely on altruism for its explanation. 
4 Costs and Benefits Under Labor-Leisure Endogeneity
In the first section, we have considered a model in which the decision to work is exogenous. 
However, there is reason to believe that the labor-leisure decision is an important component of the 
equilibrium behavior of mobile individuals. Economic theory suggests that, by lowering the relative 
price ofle:isure, an increase in redistribution will induce individuals to choose leisure over labor, and 
empirical work has confirmed the existence of this effect [Blank 1988, Treyz et al 1993]. In this 
section, we investigate the additional implications of a benefit increase that occur when the decision 
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to work is endogenous and we discover that the severity of spillover effects is unambiguously 
greater. We further discover that, under certain conditions, an increase in welfare benefits 
unambiguously worsens the welfare of the poor. 
Suppose 1here are a fixed number of mobile individuals, M, who are costlessly mobile across 
types as well as jurisdictions. Let each individual receive some disutility from work, and represent 
1hese disutilityvalues by g1.9 Mobile individuals are assumed to compare the net income differential
between 1he employed and the poor with their disutility value, and to work if and only if it is in their 
interest to do so. That is, a given individual with disutility value g1 will choose to work if and only
if 
yE_yP > gl (11) 
Let these preferences be represented by the function P(Y E - Y �, where Pis the total number of
poor individuals. 
The following equations describe the equilibrium changes that would result from an 
infinitesimal shift from labor to leisure: 
ap. -1 = 1t(l - �) - �p . > 0 
ap J J 
ae. _J = p. < 0
aP 1 
ayP 
= 
(1 -�) < Q 
ap :E <a"-1y 
a(Y8-Y� = 1 
ap L (e;) 
> O
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
These comparative statics may be employed to obtain the net effect of type-changing on the 
equilibrium results of the previous section. Suppose that, after interjurisdictional migration in 
response to a rise in b1 establishes an equilibrium, individuals are permitted to change their type. 
Given P(Y E -Y �, it can be shown that
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aP 'p' e; 
The total effect of the change in P is given by the following set of equations: 
where 
( apJ)( ap) = -[(1 -o:)1t.-o:pJe!L* > 0aP ab. 1 1 1 I 
( ae1]( apl , - - = -peL* < 0
aP ab. 1' I 
- - - < O  ( ayP]( aP). _ (1-o:)e/L* 
aP ab; L (a1c-1)'
P' L* = ----
will be referred to subsequently as the coefficient of leisure. 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
The interpretation of 1hese comparative statics yields the result that labor-leisure endogeneity 
worsens spillover effects for all jurisdictions. When a jurisdiction increases its benefit level, a 
certain number of employed individuals throughout the system choose leisure over labor. This effect 
is relatively severe when the labor demand curve in jurisdiction i is elastic and a large number of
employed individuals barely prefer work in the absence of a benefit increase. The independent 
effects on the system that arise from this change are an increase in the number of poor individuals 
in each jurisdiction, -a ·decrease in :the number ·of employed individuals in each jurisdiction, a 
decrease in the welfare of the poor, an increase in the wage rate, and an increase in the net income 
differential between employed and poor.10 
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These effects yield an important implication for previous analyses of redistribution. 
Consider the following total derivatives, which describe the overall effects of an increase in 
redistribution by jurisdiction i: 
dpi I -1 I I - = -«e,. (I + p,.- P,L*)- (a,. ) (1-x,.)- (1-«)x,.e;L* >0 (21a)db,. 
aei dei / - < - = [1 + p,. (1 -L*)]e; < 0ab,. db,. 
ae. de. I -1 > -1 = p,e. (l -L*) > 0ab. db. JI I I 
(1 -«)e/ 
'Jt. + P. (l-L*)- ---1 ' 
L (a;1')
(21b) 
(22a)
(22b) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
In each case, aggregate spillover effects are minimized when workers are forbidden to choose leisure 
over labor; in each case, aggregate spillover effects increase as the coefficient of leisure increases. 
Therefore, analyses of redistribution that ignore labor-supply effects are likely to understate the costs 
of increased redistribution and overstate the benefits. 
There is a further result that is rather striking: when the coefficient of leisure is sufficiently 
high, it is possible for the marginal loss of amenities induced by labor-supply changes to exceed the 
marginal benefit to the poor from the additional redistribution. In other words, it is possible for an 
increase in redistribution by jurisdiction i to unambiguously worsen the welfare of its poor. This 
phenomenon, which we shall call the New York City effect, is difficult to identify through empirical
observation because:the-most easily:ubservabie-components of utility (benefits and wages) are 
unambiguously higher when the effect occurs. Nevertheless, both the poor and the employed are 
worse off when the effect occurs. 11 It should be noted that, since individuals are costlessly mobile,
an increase in redistribution by jurisdiction i affects the entire system of jurisdictions.12 Therefore,
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redistributive programs designed to help the poor in one jurisdiction can actually harm the poor in 
all jurisdictions. For this reason, concern for the poor need not imply support for redistributive 
benefits. 
5 Implications for Decentralization
Perhaps the most common policy prescription in the fiscal federalism literature is for a central 
government to control redistribution . . In general, previous work has.concluded that centralized
redistribution eliminates spillovers and induces economic efficiency [Buchanan 1950, Wildasin
1991]. 13 Advocates of redistribution have used these conclusions to argue for centralization [Sinn
1990]. In this section, we examine the properties of centralized redistribution and \Ye find that they
do not hold when the labor-leisure decision is endogenous. 
Suppose that, in a system of jurisdictions that satisfies the assumptions of the traditional 
framework, a central authority simultaneously increases welfare benefits in all jurisdictions. Since 
a simultaneous benefit increase does not create any interjurisdictional differentials, the increase 
carmot induce interjurisdictional migration. Furthermore, there is a one-to-one relationship between 
increased redistribution and increased net income for the poor because of the absence of work­
disincentive effects. For these reasons, traditional economic analysis has concluded that 
centralization is sufficient to eliminate spillovers and induce economic efficiency.14 
This conclusion is crucially dependent on the assumption oflabor-leisure exogeneity. When 
mobile individuals may choose between labor and leisure, a simultaneous increase in welfare 
benefits inflicts labor-supply effects even though traditional analyses predict economic efficiency. 
The magnitude of migratory spillovers is given by the summation of equations (17) and (19) over
all jurisdictions: 
dpi I 
db = o-r<1-�)1ti-�Pi1L*.ECeJ > o (26) 
(27) 
Equation (27) demonstrates that the one-to-one correspondence between benefit increases and the 
welfure of the poor is lost when the coefficient ofleisure is l arger than zero. In particular, the extent 
to which fiscal externalities exist under simultaneous benefit increases is directly related to the 
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magnitude of the coefficient of leisure, and it is once again possible for an increase in redistributive 
benefits to harm the poor. 
The presence of spillovers under centralized redistribution illustrates the inadequacy of 
traditional concepts of economic efficiency as applied to redistribution. Basic economic theory 
predicts that economic efficiency is achieved when the marginal product of each factor is equalized 
across jurisdictions. When workers are the sole factor of production and receive their marginal 
product, optimal factor allocation implies that wages must be equalized across jurisdictions. Since 
welfare benefits distort the locational decisions of workers, optimal factor allocation also implies 
that benefit levels be equalized across jurisdictions. Since the level at which benefits are set does 
not affect the labor-leisure decision, economic efficiency is achieved at any level of benefits. 
1hat maiginal fu.ctor product equalization does not suffice to guarantee economic efficiency 
when workers are free to choose leisure over labor can be seen from an examination of the model 
given here. Since workers are perfectly mobile, wages are equalized when and only when amenity 
levels are equalized. Since the poor are perfectly mobile, amenity levels are equalized when and 
only when benefit levels are equalized. Therefore, benefit equalization is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the equalization of marginal factor products. However, the level at which benefits are 
set affects the supply of labor and hence national output. 
It is useful to label the equalization of marginal factor products as a/locative efficiency in
order to distinguish this aspect of efficiency from output maximization. Economic efficiency under 
labor-leisure endogeneity is obtained when and only when both allocative efficiency and output 
maximization are satisfied. Unfortunately, it is not possible to make a definitive statement about 
the effect of a benefit increase by a single jurisdiction on national output. However, it must be the 
case that a simultaneous rise in welfare benefits across all jurisdictions reduces national output. 
Furthermore, it can be shown that the unique set of benefit levels which maximizes national output 
occurs when all jurisdictions refrain from redistribution. Since this set of benefit levels also satisfies 
allocative efficiency, it is the unique efficient outcome. 
The public finance literature has identified three basic objectives of government economic 
policy: an efficientfillocation ufresonrces;·a-desirable1listribution of income, and a high and stable 
level of employment/output [Oates 1968]. Although previous studies found that all of these goals 
could be fulfilled through centralization, the implicit assumption upon which that conclusion was 
based is at odds with both empirical evidence and the theoretical model presented in this paper. 
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Although governments do not (and should not) have economic efficiency as their only objective, 
economic efficiency must play a role in the determination of public policy. Although centraliz.ation 
can enhance economic efficiency, there is no guarantee that it will do so, and the extent to which 
centralization harms efficiency is directly related to the level at which the central authority sets its 
benefit. Ironically, then, policymakers who listened to the traditional assertions of the fiscal 
federalists are most likely to ignore the harmful aspects of centralization and thereby impede rather 
than promote economic efficiency. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined the effects of redistributive policy on the welfare of its citizens. 
We have shown that previous work systematically understates the magnitude of redistribution­
induced spillovers and overstates the extent to which redistribution raises the net income of the poor. 
We have also shown that altruism does not cause the wage-benefit correlation and need not imply 
support for redistribution when redistribution induces a portion of the workforce to choose leisure 
over labor. Finally, we have shown that centralized redistribution does not imply economic 
efficiency unless all jurisdictions refrain from redistribution. 
It should be noted that an important assumption in this paper is especially kind to 
jurisdictions that engage in redistribution. In particular, workers are not taxed to fund redistributive 
programs. If workers were taxed such that each worker paid a sum bp/et> the incentive to move to
areas with low numbers of poor individuals would increase, as would the incentive to exit the labor 
force. Thus, workers would face more powerful incentives to migrate and to exit the labor force. 
Both of these effects amplify the results of this paper. 
The main conclusions of this paper bear directly on the question of interstate redistribution 
in the European Union. The idea that a high-redistribution central government harms efficiency is 
not well-understood by a number of officials in the European Union, as well as some economists, 
who argue for centralized redistribution in order to ensure that benefits are "leveled up" to the more 
"progressive" countries rather than "leveled down" to the less progressive ones. The analysis given 
in this paper is unambiguous: the higher ·the 1evel of redistribution 1Jrovided by a central government, 
the lower the economic efficiency of the system of jurisdictions. A central government that does 
not know labor-demand curves, amenity-demand curves and the coefficient of leisure is likely to 
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overstate the extent to which centralization will help the poor and might even hann the very 
individuals that it seeks to help .. 
The conclusions of this paper also apply to the public policies of New York City and the state 
of California. It may well be the case that, in these areas, the poor have been hanned by increased 
redistribution. If these jurisdictions are victims of the New York City effect, their policy 
presciptions are clear: increase the welfare of the poor by decreasing redistributive benefits. 
Although advocates of redistribution have used the experience of New York City to justify 
centralized redistribution in the EU, a uniformly high welfare benefit across Europe will produce 
substantially fewer benefits than traditional analyses would predict, while a reduction in welfare 
benefits by relatively generous members of the European Union might increase both economic 
efficiency and the welfare of the poor throughout Europe. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Result 7: 
Implicitly differentiating (5a) with respect to b,, we have 
aE aL (e")
-----
Since E is fixed, 
Proof of Result 9: 
Implicitly differentiating (5) with respect to b1 yields, 
Since P, rx and E are fixed,
a(P + rxE) = aL a;1
abi abi 
15 
(1) 
Therefore, we have result 9, 
Proof of Result 16: 
Let Wbe the change in (:F"-r) that occurs as a result of the influx of new poor. Since 
a(Y8-Y1} 1 
---- = ---
ap I:e; 
(9) 
and the change in (:F"-P'J that results from interjurisdictional migration is pi, it must be the case that
-wI: e; = -P'(Pi-W)
in equilibrium. This equation may be simplified to 
wr' +L e{) = P'Pj
or 
P,P'W=
---
The change in Pis given by
16 
Therefore, we have result 16, 
ap e/P' 
abi P'+L e;
(16) 
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Endnotes 
I .As Emerson [ 1991] notes, collective arrangements such as the Social Charter have been designed 
by EU leaders to mitigate these competitive pressures. 
2.In fuct, the most provocative analysis to date of the labor-leisure decision is contained in a footnote 
offered by Pauly [1973]. 
3.As Wildasin [1992] notes, costless mobility is an increasingly realistic assumption due to advances 
in commurrications and transportation technology. 
4.If this were not the case, the system would equilibrate at a "comer solution" in which each type
of mobile individual would reside in exactly one jurisdiction. Such a system would offer scant 
theoretical or empirical insight. 
5.Although there are noncongestible amenities (such as temperature), we do not require that each
component of the amenities function be congestible. It is only necessary that some portion of the 
amenities function be congestible, so that the level of amenities is downward sloping in population. 
6.Although we assume that all poor and employed individuals are mobile, such an assumption is
not crucial for the analysis. It should be noted that, when some individuals are immobile, the 
implication of changes in welfare policy may differ considerably for mobile and immobile 
individuals. 
7.The production function need not differ across jurisdictions. However, the model is completely 
general with regard to employer human capital and jurisdictional technology, both of which could 
generate interjurisdictional differences in the production function. 
8.The amenities function, like the production function, need not differ across jurisdictions. 
9. Note that the disutility value of an individual need not be a reflection of his "work ethic" if
individuals differ in ways that are irrelevant to the production process but relevant in other 
respects. For example, if a single parent places a relatively high value on free time or a member 
of a minority group faces discrimination in the workplace, these individuals are likely to have 
high disutility values. 
10. If workers with high disutility values are concentrated in certain jurisdictions, compensatory
worker migration into those jurisdictions may be necessary to achieve equilibrium. The function 
P(YE -YP) combines these effects, thereby masking the degree to which compensatory migration
occurs. However, a separation of the two effects is not relevant for this analysis. 
11. The increase will, however, reduce the income differential between the employed and the
poor. 
12. While the overall reduction in utility for the poor is identical across all jurisdictions, the
composition of this reduction will differ across jurisdictions. In particular, the reduction in 
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amenities for jurisdiction i will exceed that of all other jurisdictions by the amount of the benefit 
mcrease. 
13.In this paper, "centralized redistribution" is equivalent to the presence of a common benefit
level across jurisdictions. Thus, the analysis applies to both coordinated and centralized 
redistribution. 
14.The discussion that follows shall focus on the economic effects of centralized redistribution
rather than the moral or philosophical justifications for such redistribution. Issues such as regional 
taste differentials and central government "remoteness," while powerful rationales for 
decentralization, are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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